What is most likely for Pantheon after Alkaid-2; income, funding, buyout?

22 min readJul 4, 2022

Disclaimer — — This is not intended to be used as a basis for any investment decisions. It has been put together for educational purposes only. The information contained in this document and the spreadsheet linked has been sourced from various locations, including Pantheon’s publicly available financial data and webinars. I don’t warrant that it is correct and you should assume that I have made errors and miscalculations. I have not received any private data from Pantheon, Telemachus or any other third party, only what is available publicly. If information is not correct it is of my own doing and has nothing to do with them. You can see a more information on my webpage.

TL:DR

Pantheons analysts are under-pricing the firm, even on their metrics
NSI and Lee Keeling likely modelled using Babu formulas
Pantheon is likely underestimating flow rates
Alkaid-2 is not certain to be long-term but could be
Oil prices are likely to be $100 next year
Modelling suggests Pantheon will need cash in 2023
Farm-out/Buy-in deal should be done if it favours Pantheon
Debt should be used over an equity raise — if it comes to that
Some firms could be suitable for Pantheon to merge with and acquire their cashflows, filling some/all the 2023 deficit depending on Alkaid cashflows.
Pantheon approaching Pikka’s sell-out conditions
ConocoPhillips needs to replace lost oil from federal lands

In the absence of information, a lot of the market has turned to Pantheon Resources’ analysts to seek their advice, but as Pantheon stalwart, Telemachus pointed out recently, the analysts are more interested in their jobs than making bold predictions.

Link to post

I covered this in another note when Canaccord Genuity (CG), Pantheons bookrunner, released an upgrade in April, they moved numbers around and gave us a small incremental upgrade but positioned themselves in such a way as to not look too overzealous.

“…analyst has boosted the valuation of the resources used to calculate the target price unevenly to the rest. Where before it was 1.4 and 1.5, the target was risen by 1.3(2022 programme). Not only this but he has changed the CoS% from 100% down to 90%. What’s the net effect? An upgrade to the Target Price, but less than expected.” — Breakdown of Canaccords Recent Upgrade

This week we saw a similar outcome with WH Ireland, they labelled their note “Significant Increase to Fair Value Estimate”, but we saw only a 13% incremental increase, despite the analyst increasing Theta West (TW) to the management’s new estimated ultimate recovery (EUR), a 43% increase. I won’t spend much time on this, but how did they do it? They lowered the per barrel valuation on the SMD by almost 50%, as well as lowered the total NPV of TW upper from 20% to 5%. These were the main changes, although there were more.

If they had held their estimates flat and simply upgraded TW we would have seen a new target of 246.7p — much closer to the rest of the pack; I should note even Peel Hunt had a NAV of 252, they just chose a very low target of 50p, believing Alkaid is more than likely to fail.

Source: Author, Adjusted From WHIreland recent note

So how do we overcome these shortfalls?

It’s very hard to predict the future, hence why analysts don’t want to put themselves out there. Valuations can easily go sky-high with a couple of keystrokes. As investors, we can take a different view, we can look at what the outcome might be in different cases and formulate our own decisions. Pantheon being an exploration company does not make this easy, there are a lot of unknown factors and most of what has been supplied is the view of Pantheon themselves, which can be at best subjective, but we can take what we know and formulate three outcomes:

The pessimist view
What is most likely to happen
The best-case scenario

The pessimistic approach has been covered at length by Peel Hunt, having come in strong with a target of 50p, the analyst conducted a fair and reasonable valuation, especially when comparing to the other analyst, but seemed to almost pluck a number out of a hat when choosing a target value. I covered this in detail in my last post, which I suggest you take a read to get some background on the pessimist case.

In that post, as with this, I leaned on Tele for some advice, and he told me he and his independent expert expect an 80% likely hood of Alakid-2 exceeding 150 barrels per day per 1000ft lateral, decreasing to above 80 barrels per day after 100 days. I concluded in that note that even in all-out failure this doesn’t rule out Pantheons acreage, they will learn a lot from what they encounter and take that onto Alkaid-3, if they proceed, or Theta West; where even Peel Hunt assigned a 2x their chance of success compared to Alkaid. You can see more info on Tele’s 80% case in his note here.

The best-case scenario is normally pie-in-the-sky, and this might be great in a sales pitch but lackluster normally. We will see that a best case might not be so far-fetched, but some things will still be pie in the sky.

I will still cover the pessimist and best cases, but my main focus in this note will be on the most likely, drawing on the data provided I put forth what we could expect in the coming months and years. There are a lot of moving parts, but I want to analyse several key components:

What income could Alkaid-2 and its successors provide soon?
How will Pantheon fund its next ambitions?
When should/could we sell out?
What other avenues are available in the most likely case for Pantheon?

Forecasting Incomes

Oil sales from Alkaid

Forecasting oil production is fraught with danger at the best of times, not to mention when we are trying to model out an unconventional well in the middle of the Alaskan permafrost. I am by no means an expert in engineering the decline of a well, nor do I claim to be proficient so please take what I put forth with a grain of salt and an understanding of my best efforts. Likewise, management has said this is a long-term production test, and although we should assume it will go on long term, it might not. I will proceed under the assumption it will.

There have been many wells modelled using what is known as the ARPS equations, which have been in use since the 1940s(Chen 2003). There are newer more complex models that could be used, but since my aim is to come as close to the independent experts as possible, I decided to utilise the tried and true and modelled Alkaid with the ARPS equation for Hyperbolic Decline, which later switches to Exponential decline.

Source: Figure 6.2. Decline curves for gas production from sandstone. (Thakur 2017) & Fig. 17.5. Hyperbolic versus modified hyperbolic decline (Belyadi, Fathi, and Belyadi 2019:13)

To decide upon the reserves, an engineer will take flow rate data and information about the permeabilities, porosities and more to help guide their model. Like in the images below, the engineer will plot out the known flow rates and they try and fit the model as best as they can, adjusting parameters in the equations to match up the decline curve with those points, what is left is what is characterised as reserves. Again, this is not the most accurate way to do this, but when we are happy to have a margin of error, it will suffice.

Source: Application of Multi-Segment Arps Hyperbolic Decline Model Based on Identified Flow Regimes in Unconventional Wells (Sherman 2019) & Rate-Time Decline Curve Analysis: A Step By Step Approach (TopDogEngineer 2019)

Alkaid-2

In modelling out Alkaid-2 I had several reference points, which unfortunately at times didn’t match up. Being that the data is not widely available, I had to make some judgement calls about what we should think is the most likely scenario.

First were Tele’s prior comments of an initial decline of 150bopd, decreasing to 80bopd by day 100 this helped me set my first target. I adjusted my model for this base case to be 81bopd on day 100

From Lee Keeling’s Independent report, provided by Pantheon in their webinars, we find a EUR of 2.25mmbo per Alkaid well (they have also modelled 50% recovery from some of those wells). It should be noted the difference between EUR and what they will get out of the ground profitably; Lee Keeling has truncated the wells after 20 years, which lowers their EUR. Ultimately what is recovered can vary, for instance, wells on the north slope have been known to keep producing profitably long after their expected life — again this is pie-in-the-sky stuff. You can see the well plan below which splits wells between the normal EUR and discounted; Alkaid-2 is in the standard region.

The most recent May webinar had a lot of information, three slides, in particular, were very useful in calibrating my decline curve.

The modelling done by NSI Fracturing back in 2013 helped provide the shape of the decline curve, although I couldn’t plot their exact results, I was close. At 10,000’ laterals, my EUR was 2,513mbo or 0.13% off the mark, the first-year average was 1,311mmbo or 3.2% off and the first-month rate was 2,152mbo, or about 11.7% off.

The vertical to horizontal modelling of Joshi and Babu provided me with information about the underlying data used for Pantheons’ modelling, as well as the initial production (IP) rates. It was Babu’s initial production rates at 8,000’, which when scaled to 10,000’ provided me with the results mentioned against NSI’s model.

I haven’t seen exact data in my research on Lee Keeling’s laterals, but I believe they have used the Babu EUR of 2.51bopd; being that they assigned a 76.5mmbo contingent resource and 70mmbo recoverable, that’s ~10% down, which correlates to the 2.25mmbo recoverable predicted by Lee Keeling.

Finally using the following slide, I could again check the decline curve for accuracy. In my model when adjusted for IP of 1,200bopd — as mentioned by Pantheon in the previous slide — I was able to find a EUR of 1,086mbo or about 7.6% off. This is not as close as when we used the Babu rates for NSI, but given we are using round numbers here there is a degree of error and likely some downplaying happening. For instance, if we adjust the IP to 1,300bopd, the error is .02%, therefore it’s pretty clear they are lowering expectations compared to the actual flow rates achieved from vertical wells.

As we see in the prior slides, Pantheon expects to drill 10,000 ft laterals, but not right away. This has intentionally been left vague, but they have said they will prioritise operational reliability over the max lateral length with Alkaid-2, going as far as to provide three production expectations. I expect that they aim for a middle-of-the-road estimate with 5000’ lateral for Alkaid-2.

My Modelling for the Most Likely Case

I fit the below model to follow Tele’s 80% at 8,000’ lateral, he noted this represents the baseline and we could expect the results to be higher to an 80% probability.

For modelling Alkaid-2 I will use 5000’ laterals, this gave us a EUR of 679mbo.

This is notably less than the expectations, but in the 8,000’ case we get 1,358mbo EUR, compare to Pantheon’s conservative recovery factor estimates of 1,176mbo at 10% and 1,763mmbo at 15%, my model lands in-between, therefore I believe the model is reasonable for our most likely situation.

We can utilise the Babu rates for any comparison to a best-case scenario, although this could again look to be conservative, as we have seen it has most likely been used by the two independent experts.

For those playing Peel Hunt whack a mole, they followed Lee Keeling’s guidance in their NPV valuation, modelling the higher Babu rates.

For future wells, I have taken a stepped approach, predicting that they will have a 5,000’ lateral for Alkaid-2 and build on that for subsequent drills, targeting 10,000’ laterals as they have indicated. For Alioth-1, which is targeting the SMD, due to the lack of information and for brevity I have used the same estimates(10,000' laterals = 1.36mmbo), but it should be noted this is expected to yield a lower EUR (1.4mmbo) than Alakid.

Predicting Oil Prices

I looked at various reports from over the past year for oil prices but due to the dynamic nature of the macro environment currently, this is a bit hard to predict. But what I do note is that the more recent reports set a higher expected price for 2023, and thus I modelled this a little higher than the average expectations, this was also slightly offset by aiming for $100/b in 2022, which is lower than the average.

Costs

I took a simple approach to costs, following Peel Hunt’s predictions for transportation ($10) and pipeline fees ($9.5) of $19.5/b. I do note the transportation differential provided by the state of Alaska at the start of 2022 was $2.521 with a July TAPS tariff of $4.668, so this may be overkill, but it allowed me to forego pricing in expenses such as labour, keeping the model simple.

Alaska Location Differential — alaska.gov + Taps Tariff alaska.conocophillips.com

Finally, I priced the wells expected cost to follow the guidance set by Pantheon at $23MM for Alkaid-2. They mentioned that the first three will be higher cost, and then drop to $12MM which I followed. I then used the $23MM for the Alioth well, as well as $1MM per well for each of the mobile production units.

For what follows I have forecast out till Dec 2024, there will no doubt be more wells if these are successful, but I have left them off. As I mentioned I wanted to know what income they will provide in the short term. With this in hand, we can look at how they are going to fund these endeavours.

Funding

I’ve built a 3-year, half-yearly forecast for Pantheon, which dynamically adds the ability to adjust funding and well requirements. This will be available for free here. Again, I stress this is not financial advice; please expect errors and therefore you should not base investment advice on this document.

Looking at the model we can see that even with an increase in cash flows the planned schedule will leave a crater in the cashflows and will need to be addressed prior to the winter of ‘22/23. This can be stretched out past the winter season if they so choose as just completing the winter program won’t put them in the red. It’s just the nature of my half-yearly structure which combines some of the summer and winter programs. Nonetheless, management will be ahead of this and should expect to require funding if there are no farm-outs or buy-ins on the table. How much exactly? Using what has been modelled I would assume they should look for a cash deficit plus about 20% to have a strong buffer. This puts us at about $65MM.

Here I have modelled Pantheon taking on debt to fund the cashflows. If management wants to continue with an aggressive expansion in ’24 and more Alkaid wells, this might require more funding. Again, this is all assuming they follow the 80% model. Pantheon might favour cashflows at this time and build out more producing wells and less exploration, which would be smart and keep them in the black. This would also indicate they are at it alone as by this time if there has been no buy-in or farm-out, being self-sufficient will be the key. They could probably invest in 5–6 $13MM wells in ’24, although I see very little chance of this occurring as proving up other horizons will push a sale forward.

So, a quick recap:

Pessimistic Case: Alkaid fails to deliver long-term at an economic rate, share price likely goes to 50p, and Pantheon needs to pivot to testing better quality reservoirs, requiring a lot more CAPEX. Possibly continuing with Alkaid-3 depending on the outcome.

Most Likely: Alkaid’s a success at IP of at least 150bopd per 1,000’ lateral

Best Case: Alkaid achieves Babu IP estimates of 2,221bopd or higher. As below, this would allow Pantheon to take on $25MM less debt (no new CAPEX in ’24).

Looking forward management will have several options available to them, including:

Raising Debt
Selling Equity
A mix; like the convertible note
Equity-based deal: Farm In, Strategic Acquisition, etc

Debt

After a buy-in fell apart at the last minute and management turned down another, Pantheon did the next best thing, raised the money themselves through debt and equity raising. Heights Capital Ireland(HCI) provided the debt via a convertible note($55MM) which has options attached for both the lender and Pantheon. This, along with an equity raise($41MM), provided $96MM and helped fund them through to this coming winter. It shouldn’t be lost on investors that the principal and interest payments are payable in shares at management’s discretion. HCI had to make a value judgement on Pantheon when setting up this deal and should be seen as good as a buy-in deal.

Although this is technically classed as debt, the convertible note is essentially a group of options, because barring major issues like a delisting, Pantheon can convert the debt and interest over five years, likewise, HCI can opt to convert their debt at almost any time into shares, which they have done already for more than 10% of the principal. This is important for when we look into the future because in the case of our most likely situation Pantheon will have revenues and reserves which they can borrow against, and reducing that “debt” will allow them to access more funding and not have to sell equity. Likewise, if successful with Alakid-2, Pantheon could use the leverage provided by the options to push HCI to convert their shares. Converting shares should be the aim for the convertible note, this has already been priced in by analysts and will afford more flexibility moving forward.

I modelled that HCI would convert another $2MM in July after spudding Alkaid-2, and $10MM a few months later as data is released. At this point, there would be about a $30mm principal remaining. If management were to pay the rest in cash, the diluted share count at the end of ’24 would be 835m, compared to 854m if they elect to pay by shares (this excludes any conversion price reset). This is a dilution of about 3.6%, and comparing that to the firm’s estimated weighted cost of capital at the point in time of 6.9%, it should be a no-brainer. If the note is fully converted, it would raise the dilution to 5%.

New Debt

At the end of winter ‘22/23, Pantheon will likely have 76.5mmbo of reserves in Alkaid to leverage, if they can convince a lender to apply even $1 per barrel, they will cover the $65MM that they are searching for. Structuring repayments around incomes from the wells they have in production.

Equity

Looking at the firm’s cost of equity or CAPM, we find that this is 6.71%. Although interest rates are fluctuating, if we use their convertible note rate of 4%, we find it much cheaper for them to do any kind of deal based on debt. The firm would need to weigh up options at the time, but a typically equity raise wouldn’t be ideal. Restructuring their current convertible note could be a good idea, but again, if they are in the position of strength that we predict them to be in the 80% case then I believe they should opt for debt.

Farm In or Strategic Acquisition/Merger

The reality of a farm in is we would be selling equity, this is not always a bad thing and in this case, a farm in a partner should bring expertise, knowledge, supply chain advantages and importantly less risk. I would think that if Alkaid is successful, a farm would be very easy to find, and if we expect the share price to rise, the dilution would be less. I’ve looked at some potential suitors previously in another post.

Another option could be to acquire another firm in an all-script/equity deal or a mix of equity and debt. Pantheon’s management has previously indicated they are interested in listing on another more prominent exchange and this avenue certainly opens this up. This would take place after there is sufficient data from Alkaid-2, probably at the end of ’22 or after the winter season.

The bigger question is who could they look to?

I briefly looked at some potential firms, looking for smaller cap firms on either a US-based exchange or the ASX. Firms with either large or soon-to-be large cash flow that they can utilise to fund the next year or two while they prove up the acreage. The major issue of course is convincing their shareholders to sell.

Being that acquiring fracking sands could prove to be an issue, I thought to look in the Permian Basin for small operators who could have current supply networks which could be utilised. As we see with Jay in the image below, management has been able to get supply, but to scale up to the levels that might be needed will take an effort.

Link to tweet

If you’re interested to know more about frac sands, u/Ok-GeodesRock49 has a great post summarising it, here is a short quote from that post.

‘The purpose of a hydraulic sand (termed proppant) frac is to pack the fractures with sand to form a clean conduit for the flow of hydrocarbons back into the well bore.’

Unfortunately, the price of producing firms in the Permian Basin has skyrocketed in recent times, making them less attractive until Pantheon can surpass ~$2–3Bmarket cap. I believe that if all goes well, by the end of next winter (March) we should be well past that mark, the current analyst targets of around 250p would support it, and as I mentioned in my last note, CG and WH Ireland have been consistent in hitting their targets 12 months out to within an error of about 10%. I believe the share price should be higher than 250p by June 2023, but if it is the case, we would be looking at a market cap of about USD$2.61B/ £2.14B.

Two operators in the Permian basin that caught my eye were Amplify Energy and Ring Energy, as well as ASX-listed Otto Energy, which would be a familiar name among Pantheon shareholders. You can see more about these firms in the Appendix.

Buy Out

What everyone is dreaming of. A major to swoop in and slap $3–5 on to Pantheons 2B+ recoverable and sing kumbaya. This is pie in the sky; if Pantheon proves the economics of the acreage through Alkaid this could come about very fast. Management has indicated some majors have accessed the data room and looking closely. But we are keeping a level head and not trying to get too excited about our most likely cause. So, let’s look at the example we have all turned to for some inspiration and see where we measure up.

Pikka

In 2017 Oil Search had $3.1/b of contingent resource for entry into the Pikka/Horseshoe project, Oil Search at the time had declining oil but excess gas, so were looking to sure up future reserves.

How did Pikka compare to Pantheon?

Pikka was a more conventional oil field, with between 500–1,000mmbo contingent resources, they had a total of 17 exploration vertical wells and 7 side-tracks with an appraisal coming up over the winter of ‘18/19. It’s estimated that the JV will have spent $3.1/b again over the past few years and still no revenues.

Source: Oil Search Webinar Dec ’17 & Pantheon: April Webinar

Pantheon on the other hand has completed 5 exploration wells, as well as the Pipeline state well. If all goes well by the middle of 2023 Pantheon will have evaluated Alkiad-2, as well as re-entered both Alkaid-1 and Talitha-B, whilst adding second Theta West and Talitha wells, bringing the total to 7 wells. The key difference is Alkaid-2, if it’s commercial it negates the lack of exploration wells and should springboard Pantheon front of mind to many suitors. The key then will be how do they go ahead?

Maybe they engage separate partners for different horizons, maybe they sell off Alkaid and use the funding to take on Theta West, or maybe a big fish swallows it up whole. Either way, they would be looking to push an ultimate sale forward no matter their strategy.

The price paid will be higher than that paid for Pikka, likely around $5 or higher. They will want to see the commercialisation of the acreage and Alkaid could provide that.

There has been a recent surge of investment on the north slope as ConocoPhillips and their partner Hilcorp ramp up production on their Prudhoe Bay reserves.

Although, Conoco has also seen its plans of drilling on federal lands squashed, halting a multi-billion dollar investment in Willow, which would have brought in 150,000bopd at its peak. Not to be outdone they have also effectively blocked Santos(Oil Search’s now owner) from accessing their roads by charging “exorbitant” fees.

Lucky the Dalton Hwy is now state-owned, and Pantheon’s acreage is on state land.

Summary

Pantheon will need funding, but the outcome of Alkaid-2 will dictate how to proceed. Current estimates by the firm are below industry standards and their independent evaluations; success looks bright at 80% for 150bopd IP.

Debt should be favoured over equity in future raises if Alkaid can be leveraged, and the firm should get creative when looking for future deals, a strategic acquisition might be a smart option if they can’t find a suitable farm-out/buy-in partner.

If they haven’t already, management should knock on Conoco’s door to borrow some sugar and introduce themselves.

Source: https://cheezburger.com/template/4881343

Appendix: Strategic Acquisitions

Any kind of acquisitions would need to happen post-Alkaid-2, management would need to know that a buyout isn’t likely, and a farm-out/buy-in deal is not favourable. This option should be seen as competing with debt and a standard equity raise. The deal would likely be done by issuing shares, but rather than a typical equity raise Pantheon would be getting assets, cashflows and expertise in return, almost like a reverse farm-in.

One quick aside: I know 88E purchased an interest in Project Longhorn in Texas, but with 300boe/d coming from 32 wells, this is not a similar comparison. The $0.6MM they received in March would not scratch the surface of a $23MM production well.

Here is the TD: LR of my look into these firms, a lot more work would need to be done to identify if they are suitable, specifically around CAPEX requirements and debt servicing levels for their current acreage. A premium would need to be applied to the price paid, typically 20% or higher.

Some key items:

Listed Firm
~$500MM EV, so as not to be too large in comparison to Pantheon
>$20MM Net profit incoming, ideally high FCF
No long-term debt requirements
Ideally in fracking

Amplify

NYSE: AMPY

EV of $457MM, FCF of $26.2MM, but has declining year on year
They have several operations including eagle ford with a total of 121mmboe proved reserves, with 20.4mboe/d in 1Q22.
The firm utilised fracking in many wells.
They have a significant debt of over $200MM due at the end of next year, but see a net profit on the horizon in 2022 of $66.3MM and guidance of $45–65mm in FCF
Management projects $215–340MM FCF through 2024
Using FCF in 2022 to de-lever the firm and have net debt of -$197MM in 2024.
The FCF is expected to continue for the next decade, with an annual PDP production compounded decline of 8%.

The major issue is that they have faced headwinds from a recent offshore oil spill. This is significant and they are still dealing with this. They are currently suing shipping companies for dropping anchor on the pipeline. They have been indicted and their trial is to begin in November ‘22.

I don’t believe Pantheon’s management would take on the risk, they’ve indicated before about farm-in partners having a clean rap, but the economics support it, so I’ll be putting it to one side and seeing how it progresses later this year when Pantheon could start looking.

Ring Energy

NYSE: REI

Forecast Net Profit of 104 and 147 in ’22 and ’23
Declining net debt, currently at $279MM
They are currently looking to sell assets to de-lever
EV of $560m
Analyst have it undervalued at $4.8/sh compared to current $2.64/sh.
1Q22 $12.6MM FCF
8,870 boe/d
Actively looking to reduce their leverage ratio from 3.5 -2.0 by YE22
They have 77.8mmboe with 56% Proved Developed (PD)
The company has a low Z score, indicating potential financial distress
FCF increasing whilst under a heavy drill program

Like Pantheon, they have a sustainability focus. Drilling both vertical and horizontal wells in three regions, including the Permian Basin. Over 160 horizontals well completed by prior operators and now Ring; with lots of fracking experience.

The firm is actively looking for acquisition opportunities making it open to the idea of a merger.

With rising FCF and a strong board, this could be a candidate for a merger. There is a large drill program underway, and thus this could complicate things. But if the firm wants cash flow cheap, Ring might be a good option.

Otto Energy

ASX: OEL

Otto Energy has more cash than debt(net debt -$17.3MM)
Cashflows coming in
Listed on the ASX.
They focus on offshore drilling and thus won’t provide an operational advantage.
EV of $21.5MM, making it a small acquisition even at Pantheon’s current Market cap.
Otto holds 14.3MM shares in Pantheon, currently worth about $4MM
Otto also has a 0.5% royalty over any future production on Talitha.

With an EV of $21.5MM and shares in Pantheon worth $4m, if they could, management might be able to make a deal for the residual $17.5MM is less than the cash the firm has(TTM $24.2MM). Plus a premium no doubt. The $4MM Pantheon shares could be distributed to current shareholders.

But as with all things, there is no free lunch, Otto has a major shareholder in Molton Holdings(48.09%), a holding company owned by Dr Otto Happel. Happel has deep pockets and may resist any takeover. A deal might be available whereby Pantheon can issue Preferred stock based around the 0.5% royalty, and/or preference rights over the assets in Otto currently in event of a default.

If they could strike a deal — and they would already have an open channel to do so — this would give them a listing and cash flows for cheap.

Link to download the Finacial Model Spreadsheet

References

Belyadi, Hoss, Ebrahim Fathi, and Fatemeh Belyadi. 2019. “Chapter Seventeen — Decline Curve Analysis.” Pp. 311–40 in Hydraulic Fracturing in Unconventional Reservoirs (Second Edition), edited by H. Belyadi, E. Fathi, and F. Belyadi. Gulf Professional Publishing.

Chen, Shing-Ming. 2003. “A Generalized Hyperbolic Decline Equation with Rate-Time Dependent Function.” OnePetro.

Sherman, Bryon. 2019. “Application of Multi-Segment Arps Hyperbolic Decline Model Based on Identified Flow Regimes in Unconventional Wells.” Retrieved June 30, 2022 (https://oaktrust.library.tamu.edu/handle/1969.1/188797).

Thakur, Pramod. 2017. “Chapter 6 — Fluid Flow in CBM Reservoirs.” Pp. 75–90 in Advanced Reservoir and Production Engineering for Coal Bed Methane, edited by P. Thakur. Gulf Professional Publishing.

TopDogEngineer. 2019. Rate-Time Decline Curve Analysis: A Step By Step Approach.